Network Working GroupM. Nottingham
Internet-DraftMay 21, 2019
Intended status: Informational
Expires: November 22, 2019

The Internet is for End Users

draft-nottingham-for-the-users-07

Abstract

This document explains why, when a conflict cannot be avoided, the IETF considers end users as its highest priority concern.

Note to Readers

The issues list for this draft can be found at https://github.com/mnot/I-D/labels/for-the-users.

The most recent (often, unpublished) draft is at https://mnot.github.io/I-D/for-the-users/.

See also the draft’s current status in the IETF datatracker, at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nottingham-for-the-users/.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as “work in progress”.

This Internet-Draft will expire on November 22, 2019.

Copyright Notice

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1. Introduction

The IETF, while focused on technical matters, is not neutral about the purpose of its work in developing the Internet; in “A Mission Statement for the IETF” [RFC3935], the definitions include:

  • The IETF community wants the Internet to succeed because we believe that the existence of the Internet, and its influence on economics, communication, and education, will help us to build a better human society.

and later in Section 2.1, “The Scope of the Internet” it says:

  • The Internet isn’t value-neutral, and neither is the IETF. We want the Internet to be useful for communities that share our commitment to openness and fairness. We embrace technical concepts such as decentralized control, edge-user empowerment and sharing of resources, because those concepts resonate with the core values of the IETF community. These concepts have little to do with the technology that’s possible, and much to do with the technology that we choose to create.

However, many in the IETF are most comfortable making what we believe to be purely technical decisions; our process is defined to favor technical merit, through our well-known bias towards “rough consensus and running code”.

Nevertheless, the running code that results from our process (when things work well) inevitably has an impact beyond technical considerations, because the underlying decisions afford some uses while discouraging others; while we believe we are making purely technical decisions, in reality that may not be possible. Or, in the words of Lawrence Lessig [CODELAW]:

  • Ours is the age of cyberspace. It, too, has a regulator… This regulator is code — the software and hardware that make cyberspace as it is. This code, or architecture, sets the terms on which life in cyberspace is experienced. It determines how easy it is to protect privacy, or how easy it is to censor speech. It determines whether access to information is general or whether information is zoned. It affects who sees what, or what is monitored. In a host of ways that one cannot begin to see unless one begins to understand the nature of this code, the code of cyberspace regulates.

This impact has become significant. As the Internet increasingly mediates key functions in societies, it has unavoidably become profoundly political; it has helped people overthrow governments and revolutionize social orders, control populations and reveal secrets. It has created wealth for some individuals and companies, while destroying others’.

All of this raises the question: For whom do we go through the pain of gathering rough consensus and writing running code?

There are a variety of identifiable parties in the larger Internet community that standards can provide benefit to, such as (but not limited to) end users, network operators, schools, equipment vendors, specification authors, specification implementers, content owners, governments, non-governmental organisations, social movements, employers, and parents.

Successful specifications will provide some benefit to all of the relevant parties, because standards do not represent a zero-sum game. However, there are sometimes situations where there is a need to balance the benefits of a decision between two (or more) parties.

In these situations, when one of those parties is an “end user” of the Internet – for example, a person using a Web browser, mail client, or other agent that connects to the Internet – the IETF tends to protect their interests over those of parties such as network operators or equipement vendors.

This document explains what is meant by “end users” in Section 2, why they tend to be prioritised in IETF work in Section 3, and how that is done in Section 4.

2. What Are “End Users”?

In this document, “end users,” means non-technical users whose activities IETF protocols are designed to support, sometimes indirectly. Thus, the end user of a protocol to manage routers is not a router administrator; it is the people using the network that the router operates within.

An end user could be an individual, or it could be a collection of them; whether that be a social movement, a business, or a government that represents a large number of people.

That said, end users are not necessarily a homogenous group; often, but not always, interactions on the Internet are characterised by a seller/buyer, publisher/reader, or service provider/consumer relationship.

Also, it’s important to note that even though we use the term “user” here, this does not necessarily denote a passive relationship with the Internet; someone producing content, selling goods or providing a service is equally a user of the Internet. The emphasis here is on “end” – as in endpoint [RFC3724].

Similarly, a person whose interests we need to consider might not directly be an end-user of a specific system connected to the Internet. For example, if a child is using a browser, the interests of that child’s parents or guardians may be relevant; if a person is pictured in a photograph, that person may have an interest in systems that process that photograph, or if a person entering a room triggers sensors that send data to the Internet than that person’s interests may be involved in our deliberations about how those sensor readings are handled.

While such less-direct interactions between people and the Internet may be harder to evaluate compared to those involving people with accounts on some web service, such people are nonetheless included in this document’s concept of end-user.

3. Why End Users are Prioritised

While networks need to be managed, employers and equipment vendors need to meet business goals, and so on, the IETF’s mission is to “build a better human society” [RFC3935] and – on the Internet – society is composed of end users, along with groups of them forming business, governments, clubs, civil society organizations, and other institutions that influence it.

Prioritising end users helps the IETF achieve its mission, and also helps to assure the long-term health of the Internet. By prioritising their concerns, we assure that the Internet reaches the greatest number of people, thereby delivering greater utility by maximising its network effect.

Prioritising end users’ needs also helps to assure that the Internet itself retains end users’ trust, preserving the benefit its network effect brings.

4. How End Users are Prioritised

The IETF community does not have any specific insight into what is “good for end users”; to help make decisions involving them, it interacts with the greater Internet community. Because end users are typically not technical experts, the IETF has a responsibility to consider their interests, and engages with those who understand how IETF work will affect end users, such as civil society organisations, as well as governments, businesses and other groups representing some aspect of end user interests.

When we’ve identified a conflict between the interests of end users and another stakeholder (e.g., a network operator), and need a “tiebreaker”, we should err on the side of finding a solution that doesn’t harm end users.

Note that “harm” is not defined in this document; that is something that the relevant body (e.g., Working Group) needs to discuss.

The IETF has already established a body of guidance for situations where this sort of conflict is common, including (but not limited to) [RFC7754] on filtering, [RFC7258] and [RFC7624] on pervasive surveillance, [RFC7288] on host firewalls, and [RFC6973] regarding privacy considerations.

When such advice is not yet available, we try to find a different solution, or another way to frame the problem, distilling the underlying principles into more general advice where appropriate.

When the needs of different end users conflict; for example, between governments and individuals, we again try to minimise harm – this time, to the greatest number and most specific of end users. In other words, when a decision improves the Internet for end users in one jurisdiction, but at the cost of potential harm to others elsewhere, that is not a good tradeoff.

There may be cases where genuine technical need requires compromise. However, such tradeoffs are carefully examined, and avoided when there are alternate means of achieving the desired goals. If they cannot be, these choices and reasoning ought to be carefully documented.

4.1. Examples

  • IPv6 [RFC8200] can be used to assign a client with a unique address prefix – even though this provides a way to track end user activity and helps identify them – because it is technically necessary to provide networking (and despite this, there are mechanisms like [RFC4941] to mitigate this effect, for those users who desire it).
  • Different network operator communities have, from time to time, asked for a mechanism that would allow them to insert themselves into HTTPS [RFC7231] connections to interpose caching and other performance optimisations. This was rejected for a number of reasons, including that end users’ conception of HTTPS as an encrypted end-to-end protocol had already formed, so that changing it would harm user security.
  • The EDNS Client Subnet option [RFC7871] was developed so DNS load balancers can direct clients to the web server closest to their location. In its original form, the option let a DNS serverdisclose the source IP address from which the original DNS request was received. The discussions outlined the potential for user tracking, leading to multiple level of protection, including defining an opt out option, recommending that servers do not turn on this option by default, and recommendation of prefix truncation.

TODO: more examples.

5. IANA Considerations

This document does not require action by IANA.

6. Security Considerations

This document does not have direct security impact; however, failing to prioritise end users might well affect their security negatively in the long term.

7. Informative References

[CODELAW]
Lessig, L., “Code Is Law: On Liberty in Cyberspace”, 2000, <http://harvardmagazine.com/2000/01/code-is-law-html>.
[RFC3724]
Kempf, J., Ed., Austein, R., Ed., and IAB, “The Rise of the Middle and the Future of End-to-End: Reflections on the Evolution of the Internet Architecture”, RFC 3724, DOI 10.17487/RFC3724, March 2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3724>.
[RFC3935]
Alvestrand, H., “A Mission Statement for the IETF”, BCP 95, RFC 3935, DOI 10.17487/RFC3935, October 2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3935>.
[RFC4941]
Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, “Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6”, RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4941>.
[RFC6973]
Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, “Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols”, RFC 6973, DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
[RFC7231]
Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., “Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content”, RFC 7231, DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
[RFC7258]
Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, “Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack”, BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.
[RFC7288]
Thaler, D., “Reflections on Host Firewalls”, RFC 7288, DOI 10.17487/RFC7288, June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7288>.
[RFC7624]
Barnes, R., Schneier, B., Jennings, C., Hardie, T., Trammell, B., Huitema, C., and D. Borkmann, “Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: A Threat Model and Problem Statement”, RFC 7624, DOI 10.17487/RFC7624, August 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7624>.
[RFC7754]
Barnes, R., Cooper, A., Kolkman, O., Thaler, D., and E. Nordmark, “Technical Considerations for Internet Service Blocking and Filtering”, RFC 7754, DOI 10.17487/RFC7754, March 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7754>.
[RFC7871]
Contavalli, C., van der Gaast, W., Lawrence, D., and W. Kumari, “Client Subnet in DNS Queries”, RFC 7871, DOI 10.17487/RFC7871, May 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7871>.
[RFC8200]
Deering, S. and R. Hinden, “Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification”, STD 86, RFC 8200, DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.

A. Acknowledgements

Thanks to Edward Snowden for his comments regarding the priority of end users at IETF93.

Thanks to the WHATWG for blazing the trail with the Priority of Constituencies.

Thanks to Harald Alvestrand for his substantial feedback and Mohamed Boucadair, Stephen Farrell, Joe Hildebrand, Lee Howard, Russ Housley, Niels ten Oever, Mando Rachovitsa, Martin Thomson, and Brian Trammell for their suggestions.

Author's Address

Mark Nottingham
EMail: mnot@mnot.net
URI: https://www.mnot.net/